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Argentina  suffers  from the indiscriminie use of tariff  exemp-
tions  - exemptions  granted  to an industry  no matter what its
export performance,  or exemptions  granted only for specific
inputs (often  capital  goods).
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Like many other countries, Argentina offers  *  The more capital-intensive an industry, the
exporters tariff exemptions, or duty drawbacks,  more exemptions increase its effective protec-
as export incentives to reduce the anti-export  tion - because it is capital goods that are
bias that otherwise exists in an import-protecting  exempted from duty.  Industrialization in
economy.  Argentina is based on import substitution, a
process that favors capital-intensive industries.
Like other countries, it also grants tariff ex-  Tariff exemptions for capital goods worsen the
emptions for the entire output of particular  negative effect of distortionary trade policies on
industries or the regions in which those indus-  employment.
tries are located.  Foroutan develops a simple
model to show that the indiscriminate use of  *  Exemptions increase the demand for
tariff exemptions has several undesirable effects:  imports more than an export subsidy does,
because output in the competing domestic input
* Like other fiscal incentives, it deprives the  industry contracts. This might be desirable, if
government of revenues.  reducing production costs made domestic firms
more competitive.
* The more widespread they are, the less ef-
fective tariff exemptions are in promoting  But in Argentina exemptions are granted pri-
exports.  When they are granted only to exports,  marily for capital goods, the level of protection
they function as an export subsidy and a reduced  is nearly prohibitive for capital goods that are
tariff on imported input - so imports expand as  domestically produced, and capital goods for
a share of total output, domestic sales of output  which there is no satisfactory domestic output
contract, and the use of imported inputs in-  are exempted from duty. This type of policy
creases.  But when they are granted to an  drives a wedge between the relative domestic
industry independent of its export performance,  and intemational prices of the two types of
exemptions no longer serve as an export sub-  capital goods and encourages more intensive use
sidy.  of the noncompeting type of capital goods in all
industries.
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*  I wish to thank Jim de Melo and Dani Roderik for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.Tariff  exemptions  or  duty drawbacks  for  exporters  are  widely
used by many countries  as  an instrument  for providing  export
incentives.  Duty  exemptions  for exporters  are  intended  to- eate  a
'free  trade  regime'  for  exporters  thereby  reducing  the  degree  of  anti-
export  bias  that  would  otherwise  exist  in  an  economy  characterized  by
import  protection.  The  practice  is not  defined  as  an  export  subsidy
and  is  therefore  compatible  with the GATT rules.  Other  than  to  aid
exports,  a  number  of  developing  countries  grant  exemption  from  duty  to
purchases  of  certain  inputs  by certain  industries  located  in  specific
regions  in  order to promote  those industries  and/or  regions.  The
present  paper  argues  that when tariff  exemptions  are  granted  as  a
means  of  industrial/regional  promotion  to  an  industry  independently  of
its  export  performance,  the  tariff  exemptions  lose  their  potential  as
an  export  promotion  instrument.  To show  this  point,  a simple  modell/
is used  in  the  first  part of the paper.  In  the  second  part,  the
results  of  the  model  are applied  to the  case  of  Argentina  were  duty
exemptions  are  widely  used for purposes  other  than  export  promotion.
The  case of Argentina  is of  interest  because  it  exemplifies  the
practice  of many developing  countries  where duty and other  tax
exemptions  are used as a  means of industrial/regional  promotion.
Summary  and  conclusions  are  contained  in  the  last  section.
1/  This  model is based on Richardson  (1987)  and Herander  et  al.
(1986).-2-
I.  The  Hodel
Tariff  exemptions  on imported inputs  for  exports  (henceforth
referred  to  as TAR  for  Temporary Admission  Regime)  are  an important
instriment  for  reducing the  degree of  anti-export  bias  implicit  in
import  protection.  TAR  creates  a  *free  trade  regime 0 for  exporters  by
allowing  exporters  to  purchase  inputs  at international  relative  prices
rather  than  at distorted domestic prices. Because  TAR  is compatible
with the  GATT rules  and is  a common  practice  among  both  developing  and
developed  countries,  it  constitutes an important  policy  instrumelzt  to
aid  exports  as compared to  other  forms of  export  subsidy  which  may
elicit  retaliatory  response  by the  importing  countries.
The  model  developed in  this  section shows  that  tariff
exemptions  act  as an  input  subsidy and  an export  subsidy  combined.
TAR causes  exports  to expand, domestic sales  to contract  and  imports
of  duty-exempted  products to  rise.  The model  contains  a  number  of
restrictive  assumptions  that  help  to  keep it  fairly  straightforward
while  proving  the  point. Most  of  these  assumptions  can  be relaxed
without  interfering  with the  main  conclusions.
For  purposes  of discussion,  assume  that  in  a certain  industry
output  is  produced  by a sole  producer  who sells  hie  product  partly  in
the  domestic  market  and  partly  in the  export  market. Assume  also  that
the  protection  afforded  the  output  of  the  monopolist  is  so  high  as to
exclude  foreign  competition  in  the  domestic  market.  This  assumption  is
necessary  to separate out  the  two  markets  in  which  the  monopolist
operates.  Otherwise with  homogeneous output the  monopolist  cannot
discriminate  between  the  two markets.  The  domestic price  of  the
product  is set  by  the  monopolist to  maximize his profits  but  the
export  price  is  exogenous  and  given.  The  output  is  produced  by  one-3-
type  of  input which  can  be  either imported or  purchased  on the
domestic  market  at  a given price.  The  imported  input  can  either  be
assumed  as a perfect  substItute  for  domestic  input  or as an imperfect
substitute.  In either  case,  most  of the  conclusions  of this  paper  are
unaffected  by  this  assumption.  Domestic production of  input  is
assumed  to  be  perfectly competitive.  Let  us  define  the  following
variables:
Q - output
- Q(H+H  )  Q1>0;  Q"<O when  H and  H  are  perfect  substitutes
- Q(H,  H )  Q>;  Qi<O  i-H,  H,  when  H and  H are  imperfect
substitutes
H, H  - Domestic  and  imported  inputs
=d  - (l-s)Q  =  Output  sold  to  domestic  market
Qx  sQ  - Exports
Pd[.'  Pw  - domestic  and  export  price  of Q
Pm,  Pm  - domestic  and  world  price  of input
t  - Tariff  rate  on  H
In  the  absence  of any  promotion  scheme,  the  monopolist  chooses  s,
H and  H  to  maximize  his  profit,  W:
Hax Jr  - P [(l-s)Q(.]](1-s)Q[.]  +  P  sQ[.] - PH  - PC  14t)H
*,MOM04-
The  first  order  conditions  imply  that:
(i)  P  - MRd  where
MRd  - Pd  +  Ph [-]  (1-s)  Q[.]  and
(iia)  Pm - PM(l+t)  ' PwQ'
when  H and  M* are  perfect  substitutes  or
*
(iib)  m - MRd  QM  - PwQH and  Pm(l+t)  - Q'*
H
when  H and  M* are  imperfect  substitutes.
Equation  (i)  implies  that  domestic output  and  exports  are  so
chosen as  to  equate the marginal revenues in  the  two  markets.
Equations  (iia)  and (iib)  imply that  domestic  and  imported  inputs  are
employed  up  to  the  level where  their marginal cost  equals  their
marginal  product  at international  prices.
Now  assume  the  government  exempts exports  from  duty  payment
on the  imported  input. Because the  share  of exports  in total  output
is  equal  to s,  total  imports  for  exports  are  equal  to sH*. Thus,  the
final  import  bill  is  nows
(1-8)  P M +  s  P  H - P  (l+t(l-s))M m  m  m
Rewriting  the  profit  function  to  take  account  of  the  exemption,  the
first  order  conditions  become:
t PHM
(iii)  MRd-  P  Q-5-
(iva)  Pm  P (l+t(l-s))  - ((1-u)  HRd  +  SpW)  Q'
when  M and  H* are  perfect  substitutes  and
(ivb)  Pm- ((1-s)  MRd+  s P)  and
PM (1+t(1-9);  - M-9)  HRd  pw)
when  M and  H* are  imperfect  substitutes.
Condition  (iii)  implies  that  (HRd  - Pw)  >  . Because  in  the
absence  of TAR,  HRd - P4  and  because  second  order  conditions  require
that  MRa c  0,  the  introduction  of  TAR  reduces  domestic  sales. By the
same  token,  both imported  and  domestic input  prices  are  now smaller.
Also  because  the  bracket  on  the  far  right  of
equalities  (iva)  and (ivb)  is  greater  than  Pw (since  HRd>P  ),  both  %  and
Q'*  must  be smaller,  i.e.  total  output  has  increased. Increased  total
H
output  and reduced  domestic  sales imply an  increase  in  exports. On
the  other  hand,  given  the  assumption  of a  perfectly  competitive  market
for  H which  implies  non-increasing  returns  to  scale  in  the  production
of  H, reduced  Pm implies  reduced supply of  domestic  input. Thus,  in
the  presence  of an  increase in  total  output,  imports  must  increase.
In summary,  the  net effect  of  TAR  is to increase  output,  exports,  and
imported  input  and  to reduce  domestic  sales  of  the  output  and  domestic
supply  of thk  iput.
Specifically,  TAR  behaves  both as  an  export  subsidy  and  an
input  subsidy  in  the  form  of reduced  tariff  on imported  input. To see
the  point,  consider  the  effect  of  an  export  subsidy  at the  rate  of  z- 6 -
where  z - t P*M*/PvQ. The  profit  function  now  becomess2/
Jr  d  pd.  (1-u)  Q "  + Pw (1+z)  s  Q [.3  - P M - P (1+t)  M*
and  the  first  order  conditions  are:
(v)  MRd '  PW (l+,z)
(vi)  Pm  Pm(1+t)  - Pw (l+z)  Q'
As with  TAR, (MRd-Pw)>  0  in  equation v  implies  a fall  in
domestic  sales. But  now Pm is  unchanged.  This  means  that  the  domestic
supply  of inputs  is  unchanged.  Because  total  output  expands,  imports
of inputs  also  expand.  However, both  the  increase  in total  outputs
and  in imported inputs are  less than with  TAR.  By implication,
exports  increase  but  by less  than  with  TAR. Thus,  as far  as  domestic
output  is  concerned,  the  effect  of  TAR  is similar  to  an export  subsidy
of  z  percent  where  z - t  P*  14*/Pw  Q.  On the  other  hand,  the  impact  of
TAR  on input  demand  is  similar  to  a cut  in  the  tariff  rate  on imported
inputs  from  t to t' such  that  t'  - t (1-s). In fact,  with a reduction
in  the  tariff,  the  first  order  conditions  for  profit  maximization  are:
(vii)  MRd - Pw
(viii)  Pm  ' Pm (1+t')  =  P Q'
Because t'<t  implies Pm  is now  lower, this  further implies  an
expansion  in  output  and  a  reduction in  the  use  of domestic  input.
With  a reduction  of tariff on imported  input,  however,  domestic  sales
remain  unchanged  and  the  increase  in  output  is entirely  exported.
2/  For  ease  of  exposition  M  and  M*  are  henceforth assumed  to  be
perfect  substitutes.-7-
From  the  above  argument  it is  clear  that  TAR  is  equivalent  to
a combinati6n  of export subsidy and  reduced tariff  on the  imported
input. As an  export subsidy, TAR  causes  domestic  sales  to contract
and  exports  to  expand  by  more  than the  increase  in  total  output. As
reduced  tariff on  imported input, TAR  causes the  demand  for  the
imported  input  to increase  and  the  supply  of domestic  input  to fall.
The  above  statements  are  shown in  Figures  1 and  2.  Figure  1
shows  the  effect  of an  export subsidy,  a tariff  reduction,  and  TAR  on
total  output.  It  also  shows the  composition  of total  output  between
domestic  and  export  markets.  Figure 2  shows  the  effect  of the  same
policies  on input  demand.
Before  going  on to  the  next  section it must  be once  more
stressed  that  the  restrictive  assumptions  of  the model  are  mostly
inconsequential  in  terms  of the  general  conclusions.  For  example  it is
possible  to think  of  the  output of  the  industry  in question  to  be
produced  by a  number of  competitive  producers who  behave  as  price
takers  both  in  the  domestic market and  the  international  market.  in
that  case domestic price must  equal the  international  price  and
producers  are indifferent  between  exporting  or selling  to the  domestic
market  so long  as  no  export promotion scheme  is in  exi.stence.  It is
customary  in  this  case to  assume that  producers  first  satisfy  their
domestic market and  sell the  remainder of  their output in  'le
international  mar':et.  However,  even  in a  competitive  setting  producers
are  no longer indifferent  between domestic and  export  markets  when
some  kind  of export  promotion scheme is  adopted.  It is  4asy  to show
that  the  main  conclusions  of  the  model  continue to  hold  even  when
domestic  output  market  is assumed  to  be perfectly  competitive.- 7a  -
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Figure  1: The  effect  of  an  export  subsidy,  a
production  subsidy  and  TAR  on  total
output,  domestic  output  and  exports.
0
OQ  - initial  total  output
z
OQ  - total  output  with  an  export  sibsidy
tv
OQ  - total  output  with  a  production  subsidy  (reduction  in
tariff  rate  from  c  to  t'
TAR
OQ  - total  output  with  a production  subsidy  (reduction  in
tariff  rate  from  t  to  t'  with  TAR
0
OQ  - initial  domestic  output
d
I
OQ  - domestic  output  with  an  export  subsidy
d
0  0
Q Q  - initial  exports
d
I  z
Q Q  - exports  with  an  export  subsidy
d
o t'
Q Q  - exports  with  a  production  subsidt
d
ITAR
Q Q  - exports  with  TAR
d- 7b  -
N'  N
|  |  I  I  I  I
eiur  2:  Th.efetof
Figure  2:  The  effect  of a production  subsidy,  an export  subsidy
and  TAR  on  demand  for  domestic  and  imported  inputs.
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DOD  initial  input  demand  cutve
D'D'-  input  demand  with  an  export  subsidy
OB  - initial  demand  for  domestic  input
OA  a  demand  for  domestic  input  with a tariff  cut
(production  subsidy)
BC  - initial  imports
BD  - Imports  with an  export  subsidy
AD  - imports  with a tariff  cut
AE  - imports  with  TAR-8
II.  Tariff  exemptions  in  Argentina
In Argentina,  tariff  exemptions  are  granted  for  a  variety  of
reasons  and  constitute  part  of  a  more  comprehensive  package  of fiscal
incentives.  Fiscal  incentives  are  geared  towards  the  achievement  of
the  following  objectives (for a  more  comprehensive  discussion,  see
Bank  Report  t6990-AR,  Argentina: Industrial  Sector  Study,  Nov.  1987):
- Regional  Promotion:  Regional promotion  schemes  date  back
to the  mid-1960s and  were  adopted  to  boost  investment  in
the  economically  depressed  areas  of  the  country.
Industries  that  are  located in the  promoted  regions  enjoy
various  types  of  tax  exemptions and/or  deferrals,  which
include  tariff exemption.  In  1986,  Argentina  employed
three  types  of regional  promotion schemes. The  first  was
the  Tierra del  Fuego Regime that granted import  duty
exemption  to  both  capital and  intermediate  goods. The
second  scheme  applied  tc most  of the  northern  provinces,
and  granted tariff exemption to  the  imports of  non-
competing  capital  goods. In  the  rest  of the  country,  all
imports  were in  theory  subject  to the  nominal  duty  rates.
- Industrial  Promotion:  Industrial  promotion  schemes  also
grant  a  variety of  tax  exemptions  and/or  deferrals  to
targeted  industries.  Duty exemption or  a substantial
reduction  in  the  rate of  duty on  the  imports  of  non-
competing  capital goods  is  an  integral part  of these
schemes. The  main  beneficiary  industries  have  been  iron
and  steel,  cellulose and  paper,  petrochemicals,  and  mostrecently, the  computer  industries.  In  addition,
Resolution  No.  197/87  extended  the  right  of  duty  exemption
to the  textile  industry for a  period of two  years,  and
Resolution  No.  ME518/86 granted complete  exemption  from
tariffs  on paper  imports  for  the  printing  industry.
Temporary  Admission  Regime  (TAR):  Exporters  are  entitled
to duty  free  imports  of those  intermediate  imports  that  in
the  judgment  of  government authorities  do  not  have  good
and/or  reasonably  priced domestic  substitutes.  Exemption
from  duty  on imports  of  capital goods  is  not  an integral
part  of  TAR.  That is,  exporters do  not  pay  duty  on
capital  goods  only  to  the  extent  that  they  operate  within
sectoral/regional  promotion  schemes.  Following  the  most
recent  reform  of the  trade  regime  (October  1987),  the  list
of goods  in  TAR  was  considerably  expanded. However,  at
this  time,  it is  not  possible to  judge  the  impact  of this
reform  on  the  affected firms.  Until  the  most recent
reforms,  the  apparent  importance  of  TAR  has  been  minimal
in  the  vast  hierarchy  of  Argentina's  tariff  exemptions.
Latin  American Integration  Association,  LAIA:  Lastly,
certain  imports, mostly capital goods  and  intermediates
which  originate  in  the  member countries of  LAIA,  enjoy
considerable  tariff reductions.  According to  official
estimates,  the  average rate of  duty on LAIA  imports  in
1987  stood at  approximately  16  percent compared  to an
average  nominal  duty  of  33  percent  for  similar  products
originating  in the  rest  of the  world.- 10  -
II.1  Structure  of  Tariff  Exemptions  by Sector
Table  1  provides data on  the  average proportion  of  total
imports  that  ha'e for  various reasons  been  exempted  from  duty  payment
during  the  period r960-1985.  Throughout the  1960s and  1970s,  on
average,  more than half of  Argentina's  total  imports  have  enjoyed
complete  exemption  from  tariff payments.  During  the  1980s,  for  the
two  years  for  which  data were  available,  the  proportion  of exempted
imports  fell  to one  third  of  the  total. Rather  than  from  a  change  in
government  policies, the  fall in  the  proportion of tariff  exempt
imports  stemmed  from  the  slow-down in  the  economic  activity  that
exerted  a  relatively  greater downward pressure on  the  demand  for
exempted  imports,  mostly  intermediate  and  capital  goods.
Table  1  also displays two  sets of  data on  the  average
realized  tariff  rate  approximated  by  the  ratio  between  actual  tariff
revenues  and  imports  not  exempted from duty and  total  imports. The
observed  fall  in the  rate  of realized duty  over  time  is  the  result  of
the  gradual  lowering  of tariff barriers during  the  period. In fact,
the  actual  tariff  rate on  total imports (T) can  be expressed  as a
weighted  average between the  actual realized tariff rate  on the
imports  subject  to  duty(tl)  and  zero duty  on the  rest  of the  imports,
with  weights  representing  the  proportion  of  the  two  types  of imports
..  the  total:
t  =  at1 +  (1-a) t 2 ;  t 2 =  0
The  historic  fall  in  t1 (column 2  in  the  table)  coupled  with  more  or
less  constant  value  of (1-a)  indicates  that  the  fall  in  T reflects  the- 11  -
Table  1
Total  Imports  and  Imports  Exempt  from  Duty  Payment  1960-86
Z  Exempt  Duty  Paid
Total  From  Duty  as Z of Imports  as 2  of Total
Year  1000  US$  Payment  Subject  to  Duty  Imports
1960  1,249,291  68  49.3  15.6
1961  1,460,379  60  56.1  22.2
1962  1,345,502  54  51.2  23.3
1963  980,677  53  43.4  20.4
1964  1,077,163  45  41.2  23.3
1965  1,198,361  50  45.8  23.2
1966  1,124,306  51  51.9  2!.3
1967  1,095,542  49  38.5  19.7
1968  1,169,189  52  38.3  18.4
1969  1,576,09C  53  39.9  18.6
1970  1,684,633  54  34.8  16.0
1971  1,809,409  54  32.5  15.5
1972  1.904,682  57  30.2  12.8
1973  2,229,468  63  28.1  10.3
1974  3,634,918  59  23.7  10.0
1975  3,946,501  57  25.1  10.1
1976  3,033,000  51  22.2  11.7
1977  4,161,539  51  19.7  9.9
1978  3,853,655  48  22.2  11.5
1979a/  5,228,463  62  23.9  9.5
1980b
1985  3,814,229  33  22.7  15.6
1986  4,724,134  29  28.8  20.5
a/  First  10  months.
bi  Data  not  available  from  1980  to 1985.
Source: INDEC
reduction  in the  height  of  tariff barriers up  until  the  end  of the
1970s. The increase  in  the  value  of  T  in 1985  and  1986  stems  from
both  the  increase  in the  proportion  of imports  subject  to duty  and  the
introduction  of a 10  percent  surcharge on imports  in  1985,  as part  of
the  Austral  Plan.- 12-
Table  2  provides  information  on  the  sectoral  composition  of
exempted  imports  for  1986.  It  can  be  observed that  the  rate  of
exemption varies widely  across  sectors  --  sections of the Brussels
Tariff  Nomenclature.  However,  the  figures are  themselves  a result  of
aggregation  of  more  detailed  information  available  on the  99  chapters
of the  BTN  classification.
The  major  exemptions  are  obviously  granted  to intermediates
and  capital  goods  imports. Within  the  latter  group,  section  16,  which
accounts  for  25  percent of  imports,  electric  machinery  and  equipment
have  a  higher  proportion  of  duty  free  imports  (612)  than  non-electric
machinery  (25Z). The  different treatment of imports  in  this  sector,
as in  others, reflects the  extent to  which  imports  compete  with
domestic  output. Because  of  highly  uneven  treatment  of competing  and
non  competing  imports  in  Argentina, those  imports  that  do  not  have  a
good  domestic substitute are  generally subject to  a more  liberal
policy  and  are  the  only  ones  to  be granted  tariff  exemption.
Within  intermediate  products,  metals  imports  (section  15)  are
on average  exempted  from  duty  payment by 48  percent. However,  within
this  group,  metallurgical  products (44Z) and  copper  (88Z)  are  those
with  the  highest rate of  exemption.  Minerals comprise  another
important  category  of  intermediates.  The  average  rate  of  minerals
duty  exempt  imports,  30  percent, results from a  vary  high rate  of
exemption  for  metallurgical  minerals  (86Z)  and  much lower  rate  for  the
rest  of the  products  belonging  to  this  section.
From Table  2,  it  appears  that a  large proportion of
consumption  goods  imports  (sections  12  and  13)  are  also  exempted  from
duty  payment. However, these sections account  for  an insignificant
share  of total  imports  and  the  exemptions  are  normally  granted  to- 13 -
Table  1
Total  Imports  and  Imports  Exempt  from  Duty:
Various  Product  Categorien  - 1986
Duty  Paid  Nominal  Tariff
Total  X Exempt  X of  Imports  X of  Tot  l  Rate
1000 USS  r4rom  Duty  Subject  to  Duty  Imports  (a)
Slop  Weighted
Averago  Average
Total  4724134  29  28.3  20.5  27.0  28.0
Section  1  39964  61  14.1  6.2  19.0  19.0
Section  2  245416  42  12.6  7.3  19.2  18.3
Section  1  7203  14  27.5  23.7  21.8  22.0
Soction  4  67831  30  17.5  12.1  26.2  26.9
Section  6  670617  30  19.0  13.6  26.6  26.8
Section  6  1088182  13  18.4  16.9  18.2  12.4
Section  7  284992  10  30.1  27.0  26.0  24.9
Section  8  2692  24  81.7  24.0  26.3  24.0
Section  9  56102  6  19.6  18.6  31.6  31.7
Section  10  123261  15  26.4  22.6  23.4  27.0
Section  11  110076  22  26.4  19.8  36.0  U6.8
Section  12  1397  55  33.6  18.9  87.0  U8.9
Section  13  47203  s5  34.6  16.6  29.6  28.6
Section  14  4608  0.0  21.6  21.6  24.0  22.5
Section  16  396409  48  32.3  16.7  29.2  28.0
Section  16  1196651  40  43.6  26.4  42.6  36.6
Section  17  282831  23  46.6  36.0  28.0  28.6
Section  18  224409  26  36.2  26.5  42.6  51.2
Section  19  676  28  36.7  26.7  27.0  27.0
Section  20  24233  27  40.6  29.6  30.6  27.2
Section  21  216  100  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(a)  The  weights  are  th,  number of  STN positions  corresponding  to
each chapter.  To  the  abovo  rates  a  10X  surcharge  &ust  be
added In  order  to  obtain the  global  nominal  average  tariff
provailing  In  1986.
For a  dofinition  of  sections  see  the  following  page.
Source:  INDEC  and  Lucangell  (1987).- 14 -
Table  2: continued
Definition  of BTN  Sections
Section  1:  Live  animals  and  products  thereof.
Section  2: Vegetable  and  vegetable  products.
Section  3:  Oils  and  fats.
Section  4:  Processed  foods,  beverages  and  tobacco.
Section  5s Mineral  products.
Section  6:  Chemical  products.
Section  7:  Synthetic  materials  and  products  thereof.
Section  8:  Leather,  fur  and  products  thereof.
Section  9: Wood products.
Section  10:  Paper  and  printing.
Section  11:  Textiles.
Section  12:  Shoes,  hats,  umbrellas,  etc.
Section  13:  Ceramics  cement,  stone  and  similar  products.
Section  14:  Jewelry  products.
Section  15:  Metals  and  metal  products.
Section  16:  Machinery  and  equipment.
Section  17:  Transport  equipment.
Section  18:  Optical  and  precision  instruments.
Section  19:  Arms  and  ammunitions.
Section  20:  Other  manufacturing  n.s.e.
Section  21:  Objects  of art  and  antiques.- 15
domestic  manufacturers  for  their imports of  parts  and  components  for
domestic  peoduction.
The  data  in  this paper  are  reasonably close to those  in
Berlinski  (1985)  who analyzed  the  percentage  of duty  exempt  imports  in
Argentina  and  other  tiembers  of  the  LAIA.  Berlinski  estimated  that  44
percent  of  Argentine imports from non-LAIA countries in 1979  were
exempted  from  tariff  payments and  that the  higher  rate  of  exemption
applied  to intermediate  and  capital  goods.
11.2  Fiscal  Impact  of  Tariff  Exemptions
The  data  contained  in  Table 2  allow  some  estimation  of the
fiscal  cost  of tariff  exemptions.  Given  an average  nominal  tariff  rate
of  27-28 percent which  together with  the  ten percent  surcharge
introduced  in  1985  raises  the  average to  37-38  percent,3/  and  given  a
realized  tariff  rate  of  only 20.5 percent, the  foregone  revenue  in
1986  can  be estimated  at  approximately  775-822  million  dollars4/  . As
far  as the  relative contribution  of  the various  promotion  schemes
discussed  earlier  to the  total  loss  of revenues  is  concerned,  a recent
analysis  was conducted at  the  Ministry of  Economy for  1987. The
results  appear  in  Table  3.
3/ In  October  1987 tariff rates were  increased again  by 5  percent
across  the  board.
4/  This  estimate  is  partial  because it  ignores  the  effect  of various
tax  exemptions  on firms' activity and  hence on the  tax  base  for
those  taxes  that  firms  do  actually  pay.- 16 -
rhe  Hinistry's  figures  for  total  revenue  loss  in  1987  are  of
the  came  order  of magnitude  as those contained  in  this  paper.  The
contributing  schemes  are many. The first  reflects  the  Tierra  del
Fuego  Regime. Together  with the Industrial  Promotion  Law  and  the
special  statas  granted  to  imports  from  LAIA,  this  regime  accounts  for
the  main part of  the lost revenues.  The seconds  refers to  the
importation  of  natural  gas  from Bolivia.  It  is  interesting  to  note
that  the  cost  of the Temporary  Admission  Regime  is  relatively  low.
For  example,  imports  entering  the country  under  TAR  account  for  only
4.4  percent  of  the  estimated  total  imports  covered  by  special  regimes
and  the ensuing revenue  loss represents  approximately  6  percent  of
the the total.  However,  these percentages  are likely  to  have
increased  ir.  1988  following  the expanded  coverage  of  the  TAR  since
October  1987.
II.3  The  Impact  of  Duty  Exemptions  on  Firms'  Cost  Structure
How relevant  are  import  duty exemptions  relative  to  other
fiscal  incentives  in  terms  of  their  impact  on  the  cost  competitiveness
of  firms  operating  within the affected  industries/regions?  Due  to
lack  of  disaggregated  data at the firm level,  the  question  remains
unanswered.  From  our  discussions  with  informed  sources  in  Argentina,
it  appears  that tariff  exemptions  in comparison  with  other  fiscal
incentives  do not exercise  a  great financial  impact  on  firms  in
general,  but their impact  is significant  for a  few producers,
especially  those  located  in Tierra del Fuego.  A recent  study  by
Artana  (1987)  confirms  the above observation.  Artana  analyses  the
impact  of  various  fiscal  incentives  granted  by the  Ministry  of  Economy
to  652  investment  projects  during  the  period  1973-85,  on  the'margin  of
efficiency'  of  the  projects  involved.  In  Artana's  study,  the  margin- 17
Table  3
Fiscal  Cost  of the  1987  Import  Regime
Millions  of  US dollars
Total  Nominal  Realized  Fiscal
Regime  Imports  Duty  Duty  Cost
Special  custom  area  372  61  25  135
(Law  no.  19.640)
Gas from  Bolivia  266  20  0  53
(Resol.  no.  ME 624/87)
Cap.  Goods.  Textiles  48  23  10  6
(Resol.  no.  ME 197/87)
LAIA  1646  33  16  280
Industrial  Promotion  400  53  0  212
(Decree  PEN  515/87)
Paper  for  printing  18  30  0  5
(Res.  ME 549/89  & 518/86)
TAR  127  35  0  44
(Decree  PE 1554/86)
Total  2877  735
Source: Ministry  of  Economy
of efficiency  is  computed  by comparing  the  actual  cost  of the  projects
with their hypothetical  cost  in  the  absence of  incentives.  He
evaluates  the  present  value  of  the  implicit  subsidy  of the  incentives
at October  1985  prices  by assuming a  discount  rate  of 10  percent  and
taking  into  account  only  those  incentives  that  are  granted  under  the
industrial  promotion scheme to  all  the national territory.  The
estimates,  therefore,  exclude additional  benefits that accrued  to
projects  that  were also  affected  by regional  promotion  schemes.- 18  -
Of  the 652 projects  approved  by the Ministry  of  Economy
during  1973-85,  65 percent  were implemented  in  conformity  with  the
planning  horizon  presented  by  the firms.  Table 4  contains  the
estimated  subsidies  implicit  in the fiscal  incentives  for  those
projects.
As  noted  in  Table 4, the highest  subsidy  derives  from  VAT
exemption  and  income  tax deferral.  Tariff  exemptions  in  the  above
estimates  are  quite  marginal  and account  for  only  two  percent  of  the
estimated  total subsidy.  In this respect  Artana's  result  are
compatible  with  those of the Ministry  of Industry  which  also  show
that,  in  relative  terms,  tariff  exemptions  have  a small  fiscal  cost.
However.  it  is  important  to  recall  again that  the  figures  in  Table  4
refer  only  to  industrial  incentives  granted  at  the  national  level  and
ignore  the  effect  of  regional  schemes.  Also,  the  estimated  subsidy  of
the  tariff  scheme  is  based  upon an assumed  average  tariff  rate  of  10
percent  for  capital  goods.  Therefore,  it  is  likely  that  at  least  for
some  firms,  the above figures  underestimate  the impact  of  tariff
exemptions  on  their  cost  competitiveness.
In  summary,  our  analysis  shows  that  tariff  revenue  losses  due
to  exemptions  are  large and growing.  Evidence  suggests  that  these
losses  can  be  reduced  by  over  half  if,  ceteris  paribus,  all  exemptions
except  for  those  granted  to  the LAIA  members  and  to  exporters  were  to
be  lifted.  In  fact,  according  to  the  estimates  contained  in  Table  3,
forgone  revenues attributable  to  exemptions granted to the
aforementioned  two  groups  represent  only 38 and 6  percent  of  total
lost  revenues  respectively.  Thus, by abolishing  the  other  types  of
exemptions,  the  government  could raise its  revenues  and/or  lower  the
average  height  of  all  its  tariff  barriers.- 19  -
Table  4
Present  Value  of Subsidy  of the  Fiscal
Incentives  at  October  1985  prices
Millions  of A  I  of  Total
Income  tax  deferral  625  22.8
Other  tax  deferral  285  10.5
VAT  exemption  929  33.9
Profit  tax  exemption  212  7.8
Preferential  price  for
petrochemical  inputs  623  22.8
Import  duty  exemption  62  2.2
Total  2736  100.0
Source: Artana  (1987),  p. 42.
-II.  Summary  and  conclusions
This paper  examined in  detail the  structure of  tariff
exemptions  in  Argentina  where  the  exemptions  are  widely  used  not  only
for  promoting  exports,  but  also  for  promoting  certain  industries  and
regions.  The  case  of  Argentina is  of interest  because  it  exemplifies
the  practice of  many  other developing  countries. The  paper  also
developed  a simple  model  to  show that  the  indiscriminate  use  of duty
exemptions  has several  undesirable  effects.
First,  duty  exemptions  deprive the  government  of revenues.
This is  of course  a characteristic  of all  other  fiscal  incentives.
Second,  as the  model  developed in  Section  I proves,  the  more
widespread  the  tariff  exemption,  the  less  effective  they  become  as  an
instrument  for  export  promotion. In  fact,  the  model  showed  that  when
tariff  exemptions  are  granted only to  exports, they  function  as  an- 20 -
export  subsidy  and a  reduced  rate of tariff  on imported  input,
bringing  abbut an expansion  of exports  as a  proportion  of  total
output,  a  contraction  of  domestic  sales  and  an  increase  in  the  use  of
imported  input.  However,  if tariff  exemptions  are granted  to  an
industry  independentLy  of its export  performance,  the  exemptions  no
longer  function  as  an export  subsidy.  In fact in  the  extreme  case
where  the  exemptions  are  granted  to the  entire  production  as  opposed
to  exports  alone,  the  exemptions  increase  exports  only  to  the  extent
that  output  increases.  In  other  words  the  proportion  of  output  sold  in
export  markets  remains  unaffected
Third,  the exemptions  widen the variability  of  effective
protection  rates  of  industries  in  relation  to  their  capital  intensity.
Because  capital  goods  are  the ones to  be  exempted  from  duty  payment,
the  more  capital  intensive  an  industry  is,  the  stronger  the  impact  of
exemptions  on  its effective  protection  is going to be.  Given  the
historic  pattern  of  industrialization  in Argentina  based  upon  import
substitution,  a  process  that  has  favored  capital-intensive  industries,
tariff  exemptions  for  capital goods  enhances  the outcome  of
distortionary  trade  policies  in terms of the negative  impact  they
exercise  on  labor  employment  (see  Nogues  1985).
Fourth,  the  exemptions  increase  the demand  for  imports  more
than  an  export  subsidy  does, because  output  in  the  competing  input
industry  contracts.  By itself,  this outcome  may  seem  desirable.
After  all,  a  reduction  in production  costs  makes  domestic  firms  more
competitive.  However,  in  the  case  of  Argentina,  there  exists  a  strong
dichotomy  in  the structure  of tariff  rates.  First,  exemptions  are
primarily  granted  to  capital  goods.  Second,  the  level  of  protection  is- 21 -
very  high,  almost prohibitive  for  those capital goods which  are
domestically  produced, whereas those capital goods  for which  no
satisfactory  domestic  output  is  available  are  exempted  from  duty.  This
type  of  policy  introduces  a  wedge  between  the  domestic  relative  price
of the  two  types of'  capital goods and  their  international  relative
price  and  encourages a  relatively  more  intensive use  of the  non-
competing  type  of capital  goods  $.n  all  industries.
The  above  considerations  lead us  to  conclude that  duty
exemptions  other  than  to  exports  should  be phased  out  for  the  existing
projects  and  not  be extended  to  new investmer.t  projects. In terms  of
tariff  agreements  with  LAIA members affecting capital goods,  the
Argentine  government  conducted  a  number  of in-depth  studies  to  examine
the  opportunities  created by  the  removal of trade  barriers  between
Argentina  and  other LAIA member countries  for  enhancing  Argentina's
capital  goods  industries  in  terms  of intra-industrial  specialization
and  the  exploitation  of larger markets and  scale  economies  (see  e.g.
Prota  and  Fontanals (1987) and  Chudnovsky and  Groisman,  (1987)).
These  studies  are  very  useful in  indicating  when,  if  at  all,  tariff
exemptions  should  be envisaged  in  the  capital  goods  industries  and/or
in  other  industries  in relation  to  other  LAIA  member  countries._ 22 -
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